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NOTE
WHEN A COMPANY CONFESSES
ChristopherJackson*
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant is
normally obligated to attend all of the proceedings against her
However Rule 43(b)(2) carves out an exception for organizational
defendants, stating that they "need not be present" if represented
by an attorney. But on its face, the language of 43(b)(2) is ambiguous: is it the defendant or the judge who has the discretion to
decide whether the defendant appears?That is, may ajudge compel
the presence of an organizationaldefendant? This Note addresses
the ambiguity in the context of the plea colloquy, considering the
text of several of the Rules, the purposes behind the plea colloquy
proceeding,and the inherent powers doctrine. It argues that district
court judges do in fact have the authority to compel an organizational defendant'spresence at a plea colloquy.
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INTRODUCTION

In the late 1990s an oil tanker collided with a man-made structure as a
result of the captain's negligent conduct, severely damaging the ship and
dumping tens of thousands of gallons of oil into a bay.' Federal investigators
found that the corporation that owned the ship-a foreign company-had
committed gross negligence by failing to train the ship's crew members and
had falsified documents in an attempt to avoid liability. In a federal prosecution for violations of the Clean Water Act and other federal statutes, the
defendant chose not to have any individual from the corporation attend any
hearing, in an attempt to distance itself from the incident and avoid a public
relations disaster. Instead, the company appeared in court through its attorney.
After a plea deal was negotiated, the judge tried to hold a plea colloquy
at which the defendant would formally plead guilty to the charges in the
indictment. At the colloquy, the judge asked the defendant's counsel for specific details about the crimes.2 The attorney, apparently not familiar with the
intricacies of the case, was unable to answer the judge's questions. The
judge adjourned the hearing and rescheduled, requesting that someone from
the defendant corporation appear. At that second colloquy, the defendant
still refused to send anyone to court besides its attorney. The judge again
asked a series of questions regarding the facts of the case, but the defendant's attorney could not provide the relevant details. The judge, frustrated
that the defendant's failure to appear was delaying the case and concerned
that the defendant was trying to avoid the public condemnation that usually
accompanies a guilty plea, wasn't sure whether she had any authority to
compel the corporation to attend its own plea.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (the "Rules") generally require
a defendant to be present in court at all stages of a criminal case against her.'
Specifically, under Rule 43(a) the defendant must be present at the initial
appearance, arraignment, plea, trial, and sentencing. There are, however, a
number of exceptions to this general requirement. For example, if certain
conditions are met, a defendant is not obligated to be present at her initial
appearances or arraignment.6 Unfortunately, not all exceptions to the atten1. This hypothetical is based on actual events, but some of the details have been altered to
ensure there is no unintentional breach of confidential information.
2. FED. R. CRIM. P. Il(b) requires district courts to inquire about a number of different
subjects at a plea colloquy.
3.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).

4.

Id. If the defendant fails to appear, she is subject to arrest. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a).

5.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(2)).

6.

Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 10(b)).
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dance requirement are so clear-cut. In particular, Rule 43(b)(1) creates a
blanket exception to the attendance requirement for organizational defendants, stating that they "need not be present" if represented by counsel who
is present at the proceeding.! On its face, however, this subsection is ambiguous: while an organizational defendant "need not be present," it is
unclear who has the discretion to decide whether the defendant will personally appear-the defendant or the judge.' That is, the Rule does not clearly
answer the question of whether a district court may compel the attendance
of an organizational defendant. This ambiguity is particularly apparent in
the context of a plea colloquy.9
There are three broad reasons why this ambiguity ought to be resolved.
First, an examination of Rule 43(b)(1) will illuminate the proper interpretation of a host of other Rules, among them 4, 10, 11(b), and several other
subsections of 43, and provide helpful clarification about how the Rules
work in practice. Second, the issue of compelling attendance forms a part of
a larger discussion about the nature of criminal corporate liability in general.
There are four general justifications for punishment-incapacitation,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution'o-that might apply in the organizational context. While it is clear that compelling an organization's
attendance cannot incapacitate that organization," it is possible that doing so
7.

The Rule states in full:

When Not Required. A defendant need not be present under any of the following circumstances:
(1) Organizational Defendant The defendant is an organization represented by counsel
who is present.
(2) Misdemeanor Offense. The offense is punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both, and with the defendant's written consent, the court permits
arraignment, plea, trial, and sentencing to occur in the defendant's absence.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b). An "organization" is defined broadly as "a person other than an individual."
18 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). This definition includes corporations. FED. R. CRIm. P. 43 advisory committee's note (1995) (stating the word "corporation" was changed to "organization" in order to broaden
the reach of the Rule); FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c) (amended 2002) ("A defendant need not be present ...
when represented by counsel and the defendant is an organization, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 18
(b)

8. The Advisory Committee Notes offer little clarification. The sole reference to 43(b)(2)
states only that "the rule is amended to extend to organizational defendants." See FED. R. CRIM. P.
10 advisory committee's note (1995); see also 27 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1[643.06 (3d ed. 2010) ("It is questionable whether direct sanctions under the Rules are
available against a defaulting organization."). For one slip opinion that explicitly punts the question,
see United States v. Cora, No. CR 08-00160 SR, 2009 WL 1765647, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2009)
("The parties dispute whether, notwithstanding Rule 43[(b)(1)], this Court may nonetheless order an
officer of Fleet to appear at the hearing. The Court need not decide this issue because it finds, under
all of the circumstances of this case, that such an order is not warranted.").
9. Governed by Rule 11(b), a plea colloquy is a hearing where a defendant formally enters a
plea of guilty or nolo contendre. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
10. E.g., Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1890 (1991).
11. It might theoretically be possible to incapacitate an organization by compelling presence
at a plea colloquy. If, for example, a court were to compel the CEO of a corporation to appear, the
corporation may not be able to function well during the CEO's absence. However, given the short
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will further the goal of deterrence," rehabilitation, 3 and retribution. 4 Third
and finally, resolving the ambiguity of 43(b)(2)'s "need not be present" language is important for the general principle that it is better to know what
federal district court judges may and may not do in their official capacity.
The use of this power may be an effective means to bring about an efficient,
equitable outcome in matters coming before our nation's courts. For example, compelling the attendance of an organizational defendant may increase
the efficiency of the judicial process. An organizational defendant may be
able to delay the legal process by refusing to appear at various critical junctures, forcing the court to stay or postpone the proceedings while the
defendant's attorneys consult with their client. The ability to compel attendance may be one more useful tool a court has to ensure that matters are
handled in a cost-effective manner. On the other hand, the use of this power
also opens the door to judicial abuse, providing the courts with yet another
way to impose unjust hardships on innocent defendants.
The issue of compelling the presence of organizational defendants rarely
arises in either academic writing or legal practice. This may be due to the
odd procedural posture necessary for appellate review of the issue;" altemaduration of the incapacity and the fact that larger organizations wouldn't have a serious problem
functioning with one fewer officer for such a short length of time, incapacity cannot be a realistic
justification for compelling attendance.
12. It is an empirical question whether compelling organizations to appear at plea colloquies
will in fact reduce the number of offenses committed by those organizations. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1477, 1500 (1996)
(discussing the impact of reputational loss on a corporation resulting from criminal sanctions).
While Khanna believes that the same goals can be attained more cheaply through civil liability, id. at
1508-09, the administrative costs of compelling attendance would be quite low, insofar as it consists
only in the court ordering the organization to appear.
13. This is again an empirical question. See id. at 1500 (discussing the impact of reputational
loss on a corporation resulting from criminal sanctions). There are two unique ways in which criminally sanctioning an organization may serve as an effective deterrent or method of rehabilitation.
Organizations are generally required to report pending criminal liabilities in their annual financial
statements, magnifying the effect a conviction has on the organization's credibility or reputation.
Daniel L. Cheyette, Policing the CorporateCitizen: Arguments for Prosecuting Organizations,25
ALASKA L. REv. 175, 199 (2008). Organizations are also subject to debarment, wherein the federal
or state governments refuse to do business with an organization that has been convicted of a crime.
Id. at 199 & n.146.
14. Whatever one's views on the legitimacy of retributive justice as a moral theory, it cannot
be denied that retributivism is a basic feature of our criminal justice system. Whether retributivism
ought to be a goal in the context of corporate criminal liability in particular, however, has been hotly
contested. Compare Khanna, supra note 12, with United States v. Turner, 532 F. Supp. 913, 915
(N.D. Cal. 1982) ("[Ilt may sometimes be important that the convicted man be called to account
publicly for what he has done, not to be made an instrument of the general deterrent, but to acknowledge symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts and to receive personally the official
expression of society's condemnation of his conduct."). See generally Developments in the LawCorporate Crime: Regulating CorporateBehavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV.
1227, 1237-38 (1979) (arguing that retributivism is a goal of corporate criminal liability). Given the
recent rise in public anger directed toward corporations, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer's
Crisis,Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 28, 2008, the topic of retributivism as it applies
to organizations has become a particularly important public issue.
15. There may only be two contexts in which compelling an organizational defendant's
presence would be appealed. First, if there were a plea agreement between the organizational defendant and the prosecutor; the district court compelled the attendance of the organization; the
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tively, the literature's silence may simply reflect the fact that defendants
are unlikely to challenge a district court's request to appear at a plea colloquy. Regardless, the three foregoing reasons make it clear it is
important to determine whether courts have this authority.
Even if a district court does have the authority to compel an organization's attendance, it remains unclear who it might compel." Because an
organizational defendant is not an individual person,' the organization
itself cannot appear in court: unlike a human being, it has no physical
manifestation. Historically, English courts had trouble applying criminal
law-a system designed to punish individual persons-to organizations for
precisely this reason." However, since 1909 American courts have recognized the applicability of criminal sanctions to organizations,20 and the
Rules clearly contemplate that someone may be compelled to attend: Rule
43 states that an organizational defendant need not be present so long as it
is represented by counsel.2 ' In the same vein, Rule 11(a)(4) states, "If a
defendant refuses to enter a plea or if a defendant organization fails to appear, the court must enter a plea of not guilty."22 This language implicitly
assumes the existence of someone who could attend the proceedings. The
Rules simply do not indicate who that person is.23 For purposes of this
organization refused to appear; the plea was not entered; the organization went to trial and was
found guilty; and the organization was given a harsher punishment than it would have received
under the plea agreement. Alternatively, a prosecutor could request a writ of mandamus from the
district court compelling the presence of the defendant.
16. "[F]ew corporations or other organizations in active business will incur the risks of nonappearance." MOORE ET AL., supra note 8, at 1643.06.
17. Whoever appears as the representative must also be accompanied by the organization's
counsel. E.g., Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp., 764 F.2d 1381, 1385 (llth Cir. 1985) (holding that a corporation may not represent itself pro se, but rather must employ an attorney to represent it in court);
Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); Simbraw, Inc. v.
United States, 367 F.2d 373, 373 (3d Cir. 1966) (same).
18. This is not to say the law does not consider organizations to be persons in some respects.
See, e.g., Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 558 (1844) (holding
that a corporation doing business in a particular state is a person, and therefore an inhabitant of that
state, "much as a natural person").
19. See L.H. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 1-12
(1969) (analyzing the way in which English courts developed corporate criminal liability).
20. Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation:A New Approach to Corporate
Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 353 n.2 (1979) ("The Supreme Court first recognized the criminal
liability of corporations in New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481
(1909)."); see also Emmett H. Miller B11,Note, Federal Sentencing Guidelinesfor Organizational
Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REv. 197, 201-03 (1993) (discussing the current state of the law with
regard to criminal sanctions against organizations).
21.

FED. R. CRIm. P. 43(b)(1).

22.

FED. R. CIuM. P. Il(a)(4).

23. The only clue the Rules give us comes from 4(c)(3)(C): "A summons is served on an
organization by delivering a copy to an officer, to a managing or general agent, or to another agent
appointedor legally authorized to receive service of process." FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)(3)(C) (emphasis
added). The individual appearing for a corporation must be appointed by the organization's board of
directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010) ("The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors .... "). For all other organizations, the individual must be authorized as an agent of the
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Note, however, the important point is that the individual is not the organization's counsel.24
This Note argues that federal district courts have the authority under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(b)(1) to compel the attendance of
organizational defendants" at plea colloquies. Part I demonstrates that the
Rules are best read together in a way that gives the district courts this power.
Part II discusses the underlying purposes of plea colloquies and contends
that they are best achieved by giving district courts the discretion to compel
attendance. Lastly, Part III argues that the inherent powers of the court provide another, independent basis for the view that district courts can compel
organizational defendants' presence.
I.

OTHER RULES ON ATTENDANCE

This Part examines six other subsections of the Rules relating to attendance: 10(b), which governs the defendant's presence at an arraignment;
43(a), which requires the defendant's presence at various stages of the proceedings against her; 43(b)(2), which concerns the presence of a defendant
charged with a misdemeanor; 43(b)(3), which deals with the defendant's
presence at a conference on a legal question; 43(b)(4), which governs the
defendant's presence at a sentencing correction hearing; and 43(c), which
permits the defendant to waive her right to be present in some circumstances. This examination lends support to the claim that district courts can
compel the presence of an organizational defendant at a plea colloquy under
43(b)(1).
One point needs to be made before delving into the statutory analysis.
This Part discusses several topics-among them capital punishment and
obstreperous defendants-that do not seem to be applicable to organizational defendants. These topics are relevant not because they apply directly
to an organization; rather, they are discussed as part of a larger argument
that the Rules must be read in a particular way. Having argued for a particular reading of the Rules, this Note then applies that reading to organizational
defendants, finding they may be compelled to attend a plea colloquy.

organization, e.g., Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp., 764 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 1985). That person may
be an officer, a high managerial agent, or another individual all together.
The justification used to require an individual to appear at a plea colloquy may determine
which individual should be compelled to appear. For example, if the purpose of the presence requirement is to ensure that the plea colloquy can be completed, the judge would prefer to have
someone intimately familiar with the details of the criminal activity appear, who may or may not be
a particularly high-ranking manager. Alternatively, if the purpose is to validate retributivist goals of
punishment or perhaps send a clear message to the corporation, the court might very well prefer that
the chief executive officer, or some other person from senior management, attend.
24. Since Rule 43(b)(1) permits the organization's absence so long as that organization is
represented by counsel, the question posed by the provision's ambiguity is whether a district court
judge can compel the attendance of another individual associated with the organization.
25. All references to the appearance of an "organizational defendant" refer to the attendance
of a person affiliated with the organization who is not that organization's attorney.
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A. Arraignments Under Rule 10(b)

Rule 10(b) permits criminal defendants (whether organizations or individuals) to be absent from their arraignments, but district judges have
discretion to compel defendants' attendance. Rule 10 is concerned with ar26
raigning defendants. While Rule 43 compels a defendant's presence at an
arraignment generally,27 subpart (b) of Rule 10 provides an exception: a defendant does not need to appear at the arraignment if, among other
conditions, she submits a written waiver of attendance and the court accepts
that waiver.2 It is within the discretion of the court to reject the waiver and
29
compel attendance. The Advisory Committee Notes make this clear by
observing that "[i]f the trial court has reason to believe ... the defendant
should not be permitted to waive the right, the court may reject the waiver
and require that the defendant actually appear in court."30 Further, 10(b) uses
the same language as 43(b)(1), stating the defendant "need not be present"
at the arraignment.3 It is a canon of statutory construction that identical language utilized throughout one statute has a single meaning.32 Consequently,
the phrase "need not be present" in 43(b)(1) should be interpreted to mean
just what it means in 10(b), giving district courts the discretion to compel
attendance.
The reasoning behind the adoption of Rule 10 further justifies interpreting 43(b)(1) in this manner. In determining whether the defendant should be
allowed to be absent for her arraignment, the Committee noted it "was concerned that permitting a defendant to be absent from the arraignment could
be viewed as an erosion of an important element of the judicial process."33 In
the end, however, "[tihe Committee nonetheless believed that in appropriate
circumstances the court, and the defendant, should have the option of conducting the arraignment in the defendant's absence."3 The prospect of
permitting absence at a hearing to enter a guilty plea, however, was firmly
foreclosed: "it [is] more appropriate for the defendant to appear personally
before the court" when pleading guilty. 3 While the Committee did not
26.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 10.

27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a); see also Valenzuela-Gonzales v. U.S. Dist. Court, 915 F.2d 1276,
1280 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Rules 10 and 43 require a defendant to be present in court for the
arraignment).
28.

FED. R.

CRIM. P. 10(b).

29. While the Advisory Committee's Notes are not binding, these "well-considered Notes
[serve] as a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules." Tome v. United States, 513 U.S.
150, 160 (1995) (plurality opinion) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988)
(referencing the Federal Rules of Evidence, which are promulgated in the same manner via the
Rules Enabling Act)); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988).
30.

FED.

31.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 10(b).

R. CRIM. P. 10 advisory committee's note (2002).

32.

E.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990).

33.

FED. R.

34.

Id.

35.

Id.

CRIM. P. 10 advisory committee's note (2002).
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explain why it refused to extend the 10(b) waiver process to guilty pleas,
the concern might have had something to do with the fact that substantially
more rights are implicated at the plea colloquy than at arraignment.3 ' Either
way, if the Rules express a clear preference for defendants to be present at
the plea colloquy-and the Committee Notes to Rule 10 make it clear they
do-then Rule 43 should be read to give district courts the discretion to
compel attendance at a plea colloquy.
One counter-argument to this interpretation should be considered. It is
possible to interpret 10(b)(3) as a provision that gives power to the district
courts (the "power-granting" interpretation). The argument for this interpretation goes as follows: 10(b)(3) specifies that a district court must accept the
defendant's submitted waiver for that defendant's absence to be permitted at
her arraignment. But if the court had the discretion to either accept or reject
the waiver without 10(b)(3), then 10(b)(3) would be superfluous. Since no
38
language in the Rules is superfluous, 10(b)'s statement that the defendant
"need not be present" must be read to mean that the court does not have the
discretion to refuse the defendant's waiver. And since the same phrase"need not be present"-is used in 43(b)(1), the same interpretation must
likewise apply: 43(b)(1)'s statement that an organizational defendant need
not be present must be read to mean the court does not have the power to
compel attendance.
There is, however, a different interpretation of Rule 10(b)(3) that is consistent with the idea that the phrase "need not be present" rests the
discretion with the district courts, rather than the defendant (the "satisfyingthe-waiver" interpretation). Under this interpretation, Rule 43 broadly
allows an organizational defendant to be absent from any proceeding, while
Rule 10 carves out a specific exception in the case of arraignments only.
Under Rule 10, the waiver the defendant submits must satisfy a series of
conditions: (1) both the defendant and her counsel must have signed the
waiver;39 (2) the waiver must affirm that the defendant has received a copy

36. Id. (noting only that it is "more appropriate" for a defendant to appear when pleading
guilty). It is of course possible that the rationale behind this decision is motivated by a concern that
applies to individual defendants only, and not to organizations. However, because (1) we don't have
any indication from the Advisory Committee about what the rationale actually is, (2) the Rules
apply with equal force both to organizational and individual defendants, and (3) the Rules very
clearly express a preference for defendants generally to be present at plea colloquies, the Rules
ought to be interpreted in that manner until some plausible counter-interpretation is put forward.
37.

See infra Section II.B.

38. E.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir.
1991) ("Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole,
giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that
renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.").
39. 10(b)(2) might be read to require pro se defendants to appear at their arraignments, depending on whether the phrase "signed both by defendant and defense counsel:' FED. R. CRWai. P.
10(b) (emphasis added), means that two separate individuals must sign the waiver, or rather that the
defendant may sign both as the defendant and as her own counsel. Given that the Advisory Committee was concerned with "difficulties in providing the defendant with effective and confidential
assistance of counsel if counsel, but not the defendant, appears at the arraignment" FED. R. CRIM. P.
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of the indictment or information; and (3) the plea must be not guilty.0 Further, 10(b)(1) requires that the defendant be charged with a misdemeanor,
and not a felony.4' As a result, 10(b)(3), requiring the court to accept the
defendant's waiver in order to permit the defendant's absence, was included
to ensure that the court is satisfied that all the conditions listed above have
been met. 10(b)(3), in other words, does not vest the district court with the
authority to compel attendance where it would not have had it otherwise.
Rather, it requires that the court find that the conditions laid out in 10(b) are
met by accepting the waiver. At the same time, the district court does have
the discretion to compel attendance.42 Consequently, the phrase in 10(b) that
vests the court with this discretion is not 10(b)(3), but rather 10(b)'s "need
not be present" language. Finally, the same interpretation of "need not be
present" should be given to 43(b)(1), and so 43(b)(1) must be read to vest
discretion in the district courts.
There are two reasons why the satisfying-the-waiver interpretation of
10(b)(3) is the correct one. First, this interpretation appears to be what the
Advisory Committee had in mind when it drafted the Rule. The Committee
Notes state that Rule 10 "provides that the court may hold an arraignment in
the defendant's absence when the defendant has waived her right to be present in writing and the court consents to that waiver."43 This sentence does
not suggest that the court must consent to the absence of the defendant generally, but rather to the waiver specifically. The district court, in other words,
must be satisfied that the conditions of the waiver are met before permitting
the defendant's absence.
Second, the construction courts have given to a similar provision in Rule
43(c) also supports the satisfying-the-waiver interpretation. 43(c), like
10(b), permits a defendant in some cases to waive her presence in the courtroom." From the caselaw it is clear that under 43(c) a judge has the
discretion to compel the presence of the defendant even if the defendant has
waived her continued presence pursuant to the Rule.45 This is the case even
though 43(c) does not have any provision like 10(b)(3).4 It follows from
these premises that a court may have the authority to refuse to accept a
waiver of attendance even if the relevant Rule does not explicitly give the
court this authority: if an explicit provision under the Rules were required,
then the district courts would not have the authority to reject a waiver under
43(c). And if a district court has the authority to reject a waiver, though the
Rule does not explicitly say so, then 10(b)(3)--requiring that the court
10(b) advisory committee's note (2002), the Committee might well have had this requirement in
mind.
40.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 10(b).

41.

Id.

42.

See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.

43.

FED. R. Cium. P. 10(b) advisory committee's note (2002) (emphasis added).

44.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c).

45.

See infra Section I.D.

46.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c).
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accept the waiver-should not be given the power-granting interpretation: it
is not necessary for 10(b)(3) to be interpreted this way for the district courts
to have this authority (because, as noted, such authority exists in cases
where the language of 10(b)(3) is absent), and so this subsection would be
mere surplusage if it were read in that manner. Since no part of a statute
should be read to be superfluous 47 the alternative, satisfying-the-waiver,
interpretation should be accepted.
B. Presence UnderRule 43(a)

District courts have some discretion regarding attendance even in cases
where Rule 43(a), on its face, compels the defendant's presence. Rule 43(a)
has a general requirement that a defendant be present during her trial.48 In
49
the Second Circuit considered whether a disUnited States v. Cannatella,
trict court could permit the absence of a defendant when none of the
exceptions in Rule 43 applied. There the defendant filed a request to permit
his absence from trial because of a serious heart condition.50 The court held
that while a judge can and normally should compel the defendant's presence, in "exceptional circumstances" the judge may "exercise his discretion
to accept a waiver of appearance ... in a criminal trial . . . .""The court held

that even though Rule 43 explicitly requires the defendant's presence, district courts can still determine whether or not a defendant will be permitted
to absent herself from the proceedings. Other circuit courts have also followed suit.52
Although the Second Circuit never made it clear how far this power extends, Cannatella does demonstrate that district courts may determine
whether or not a defendant will be required to appear even when the plain
language of Rule 43 does not permit the courts to make this decision. And
if a district court has discretion in matters of attendance even when the text
of the Rule appears to forbid it, an ambiguous provision of the same Rule
should be interpreted in a way that vests the same kind of discretion in the
court.

47.

See supra note 38, 46 and accompanying text.

48. FED. R. Cam. P. 43(a). However, 43(c) creates several exceptions to this requirementfor example, if a defendant voluntarily absents herself from trial. FED. R. CRI. P. 43(c).
49.

597 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).

50.

Id. at 27.

51.

Id. at 28.

52. E.g., United States v. Blue, No. 91-00165, 1993 WL 14978, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 25, 1993)
(holding that because the defendant did not show good cause for being absent at trial, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying his request) (citing Cannatella,597 F.2d at 28); In re United
States, 784 F.2d 1062, 1063 (11 th Cir. 1986) (citing Cannatella,597 F.2d at 28).
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a)(2). The court might have considered resting its decision on Rule
43(c), which permits a defendant to waive her presence at trial. That subsection, however, requires a
defendant to initially be present at trial; in this case, the defendant requested the trial court permit
his absence "at all stages of the trial." Cannatella,597 F.2d at 27 (emphasis added).
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C. Proceedings Under 43(b)(2)

While Rule 43(b)(2) permits a defendant to be absent from court when
charged with a misdemeanor, district courts are still empowered to compel
attendance in spite of this Rule. This further supports the view that the same
discretion exists under 43(b)(1). Rule 43(b)(2) states that a defendant is not
obligated to be present in cases where the charged offense is a misdemeanor.M This subsection of Rule 43 utilizes the same language as
43(b)(l)-the language at issue in this Note-stating the defendant "need
not be present."" Rule 43 is written such that the phrase "need not be present" only appears once in subsection (b), applying equally to (b)(1) and
(b)(2). As a result, any interpretation of the phrase will necessarily apply to
both subsections of Rule 43.
The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 43 make it clear that it is within
the court's discretion to decide whether or not to permit the absence of a
defendant under 43(b)(2). The committee stated that the Rule "empower[s]
the court in its discretion, with the defendant's written consent, to conduct
proceedings in misdemeanor cases in defendant's absence .... The Rule ...
leaves it discretionarywith the court to permit defendants in misdemeanor
cases to absent themselves .... " Because the same interpretation of the

phrase "need not be present" will apply to Rule 43(b)(1) and (b)(2), the district court should therefore have the same discretion to compel the
attendance of an organizational defendant.
One argument cuts against this interpretation of Rule 43(b). While
43(b)(1) and (b)(2) utilize the same "need not be present" language,
43(b)(2) imposes an additional requirement before a defendant may be absent: the Rule also requires the court to "permit ... arraignment, plea, trial,
and sentencing to occur in the defendant's absence."" Rule 43(b)(2) explicitly says the court has the discretion to decide whether the defendant may be
absent; 43(b)(1), on the other hand, has no corresponding language. Consequently, the argument goes, the drafters must have intended the courts not to
have that discretion in cases where the defendant is an organization (the
"nondiscretionary" interpretation).
However, that interpretation ignores the fact that while the Rule does require the court to permit the proceedings to continue in the defendant's
absence, it uses the conjunctive form-the Rule requires the court to permit
"arraignment, plea, trial, and sentencing" all to occur without the
R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(2).

54.

FED.

55.

Id. 43(b).

56.

FED.

R. CRIm. P. 43 advisory committee's note (1946) (emphasis added).

57.

FED.

R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(2) (emphasis added).

58. This conclusion follows from the canon of statutory construction expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168-69 (2003) (discussing this canon, but holding also that it
normally applies only in cases where "the items expressed are members of an 'associated group or
series,' justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not
inadvertence" (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002))).
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defendant. 9 The Rule, in other words, does not give the district court any
powers it would not have had otherwise. Rather, it is imposing an additional
requirement not found in 43(b)(1): the court, if it is to permit the absence of
a defendant pursuant to 43(b)(2) at all, must permit the absence through
every proceeding from arraignment through sentencing (the "conjunctive"
interpretation). As a result, three requirements must be met for a defendant
to be absent under 43(b)(2): (1) the crime charged must be a misdemeanor;
(2) the court must permit the defendant's absence; and (3) that permission
must extend not just to some of the proceedings, but to all of them.6
Policy concerns underlying 43(b)(2) further support the conjunctive interpretation. Permitting a defendant to be absent from the proceedings
against her for a misdemeanor charge recognizes that larger districts may
impose considerable hardship and expense on a defendant who would be
obligated to travel great distances to appear.6 ' This hardship may not be
"commensurate with the gravity of the charge," and so the court is empowered to permit the defendant's absence. 62 43(b)(2) asks district courts to
weigh the hardship that would be imposed on the defendant by forcing her
63
to appear against the gravity of the misdemeanor charge. Because the defendant will usually have to appear at the same court for all of the
proceedings," the same degree of hardship will befall the defendant at each
proceeding. The Rule, in other words, is concerned with the aggregatehardship imposed on the defendant through all the proceedings, rather than with
the hardship imposed by each individual appearance.

59.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(2) (emphasis added).

60. This leaves open the question of what would happen if a defendant gave her written
consent to be absent at some time midway through the proceedings-for example, after the arraignment but before the trial. Rule 43 may be read either to require the defendant's presence for the
remainder of the proceedings because, since the arraignment has already taken place, the district
court cannot permit the defendant's absence at the arraignment; or alternatively, to give the judge the
discretion to allow the defendant to be absent at any time after the written consent is given to the
court, on the theory that the judge can retroactively permit the defendant's absence.
61.

FED.

62.

Id.

R. CRIM. P. 43 advisory committee's note (1946).

63. The same policy concerns will apply to an organizational defendant as well. While it is
true that a larger organization with resources may be able to more easily bear the cost of travel than
an individual, that is not always the case: a small, financially strapped organization will have a much
harder time allocating resources to attend a plea colloquy than a wealthy individual. Moreover,
permitting a defendant to be absent rests the discretion with the district court, which can make a
determination based on the particular case whether there is in fact a burden on the organization.
Finally, if it is true that an organization can easily bear this cost, that would only serve to bolster the
claim that organizations may be compelled to attend.
64. However, this is not always the case. For example, the defendant might move partway
through the proceedings to a location farther or closer to the court. The Advisory Committee Notes
do not appear to consider this possibility. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 advisory committee's note (1944).
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D. Proceedings Under 43(b)(3)

43(b)(3) does not require a defendant's presence where the proceeding
"involves only a conference or hearing on a question of law."65 As with
43(b)(1), this subsection utilizes the same "need not be present" language,
requiring any interpretation of this subsection to apply with equal force to
43(b)(3).6 Federal caselaw implies that a district court is permitted to require the presence of a defendant at a 43(b)(3) hearing or conference. In
United States v. Sherman, the Ninth Circuit considered an appeal by a dehim to be
fendant who claimed the district court was obligated to require
67
present at an in-chambers discussion of jury instructions. The court ruled
that 43(b)(3) permitted the trial court not to compel the defendant's presence, holding that "[t]he district court's failure to require that Sherman be
present during the in-chambers proceedings regarding the jury instructions
was not error."" While the Ninth Circuit did not directly assert that a district
judge had the power to affirmatively compel the defendant's presence if it
wanted, this holding implies that the court has this authority: the Ninth Circuit opinion gave no indication that the judge would have been forbidden
from requiring attendance. In United States v. Graves, the Fifth Circuit
adopted the same view, holding that the district court did not err in refraining from requiring the defendant's presence at meeting in the judge's
chambers.69
E. Proceedings Under 43(b)(4)

43(b)(4) permits a defendant's absence where the proceeding involves
"the correction or reduction of sentence."70 The interpretation of "need not
be present" in this subsection must be applied equally to 43(b)(1). 7 Parallel
to the argument already made in Section I.C, the Advisory Committee Notes
contemplate that it is within the court's discretion whether to permit the absence of the defendant pursuant to this subsection. The notes state, "Rule
43(c)(4) [now 43(b)(4)] would permit a court to reduce or correct a sentence
under Rule 35(b) or (c), respectively, without the defendant being present." 72
Therefore, 43(b)(1) must also give the district courts discretion.

65.

FED. R. CRuM. P. 43(b)(3).

66.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b); supra note 7 and accompanying text.

67. 821 F.2d 1337, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1987). The defendant argued that the court never required him to attend and that because he didn't attend the conference, his conviction should be
overturned. Id.
68.

Id. at 1339.

69.

669 F.2d 964, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1982).

70.

FED.

71.

Id.; supra note 55 and accompanying text.

72.

FED.

R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(4).
R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(4) advisory committee's note (1998) (emphasis added).
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F. Waiving Presence Under Rule 43(c)

The Rules do not give the defendant the right to be absent even when
43(c) explicitly allows the defendant to waive her right to be present. Rule
43(c) states that a defendant waives her right to be present when she is voluntarily absent or is engaged in disruptive behavior that justifies removal
from the courtroom, so long as she "was initially present at trial, or ... had
pleaded guilty or nolo contendere."" This provision ensures that a defendant
does not "defeat the proceedings by voluntarily absenting himself' or by
being so disruptive as to prevent the proceedings from continuing.7 4 This
portion of Rule 43 was included to reflect the Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois v. Allen, where the Court held that in dealing with an obstreperous
defendant, a district court may "take him out of the courtroom until he
promises to conduct himself properly.""
Even in cases where Rule 43(c) permits a defendant to waive her presence and the court has no explicit power to compel attendance, the
defendant lacks the ultimate discretion to decide whether or not she will
attend. There are two types of cases where a defendant, having properly
waived her right to be present under 43(c), can still be compelled to attend
the proceedings against her. First, the defendant's right to be present during
a trial for a capital offense may be so fundamental that it is unwaivable. 6
Second, the district court may simply choose to compel the attendance of
the defendant, notwithstanding 43(c). The Third Circuit held in United
States v. Moore that "[w]hile Rule 43 does permit the court to continue the
trial when the defendant absents himself, it does not, concomitantly, vest a
rightof absence in a defendant."77 Similarly, in United States v. Lumitap, the

Ninth Circuit considered the defendant's argument that, because Rule 43(c) 78
permits a trial to continue in spite of the defendant's absence, the Rule gives
73. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c)(1). Because of the requirement that the defendant was either
initially present at trial or already pled guilty, this subsection does not normally apply to 11(b) plea
colloquies.
74. FED. R. Cium. P. 43(c) advisory committee's note (1946); see also, e.g., United States v.
Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11 th Cir. 2001); Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1080 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629,631 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
75. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970); see also Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S.
17, 18 (1973).
76. Compare Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) ("[Aln accused who is in
custody and one who is charged with a capital offense [is] incapable of waiving the right .... ), and
Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir. 1963) ("Petitioner's first claim is based on the
contention that due process guarantees to an accused the right to be present ... especially where
capital punishment is involved. So fundamental is this right that it may not be waived.") (citing Hopt
v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884)), with Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding a
defendant may waive his constitutional right not to be present), and People v. Robertson, 767 P.2d
1109, 1133-34 (Cal. 1989) (same).
77. 466 F.2d 547, 548 (3d Cir. 1972). But see United States v. Cannatella, 597 F.2d 27, 27
(2d Cir. 1979) ("We see no necessity at this point, however, to go as far as the Third Circuit did in
United States v. Moore, 466 F.2d 547 (1972).. . .") (dictum).
78. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit refers to 43(b). 111 F.3d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1997). The
Rules were restyled in 2002 so that the current Rule 43(c) is the former Rule 43(b). FED. R. CIuM. P.
43 advisory committee's note (2002).
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the defendant an affirmative right to waive his presence at trial in order to
avoid being identified.79 The court held that it was not an abuse of the trial
court's discretion to deny the defendant's request not to be present.8
In sum, the Rules vest the district courts with a great deal of discretion
in deciding whether a defendant needs to be present throughout the proceedings against her. Read together, they are best interpreted to give the district
courts the power to compel the attendance of an organizational defendant at
a plea colloquy.
II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE I I(B) PLEA COLLOQUY

The previous Part primarily dealt with an interpretation of the meaning
of 43(b)(1)'s phrase "need not be present," providing a general argument
that district courts may compel an organizational defendant's presence at
any proceeding. This Part focuses in on attendance at the plea colloquy in
particular, making several claims. The Rules and the Supreme Court recognize the particular importance of the defendant's presence at a plea colloquy
generally; there may be good reasons to require the presence of an organizational defendant in particular; there are a great many rights implicated
during a plea colloquy; and finally, courts have traditionally been accorded
flexibility in plea colloquy procedure. Taken together, these arguments provide good reason to find that district courts have the power to compel
organizational defendants' presence at such proceedings.
A. The Importance of a Defendant's Presence
at the Plea Colloquy Generally

The Rules recognize the particular importance of the defendant's presence at a plea colloquy. The text of Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee
Notes accompanying the Rule make it clear that attendance at a plea colloquy is exceedingly important. Although 43(a) already requires that the
defendant attend the plea colloquy," Rule 11 still makes the attendance requirement explicit on its own terms, and does so more than once.82 The
Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 11 further emphasize the importance of
the presence of the defendant when they say, "[b]y personally interrogating
the defendant, not only will the judge be better able to ascertain the plea's
voluntariness, but he will also develop a more complete record to support
his determination in a subsequent post-conviction attack." The Advisory
79.

Lumitap, Ill F.3d at 83.

80.

Id. at 84 (citing United States v. Fitzpatrick, 437 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1970)).

81.

FED. R. CRIm. P. 43(a)(1).

82. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b)(1) ("[T]he court must address the defendant personally in open
court."); FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b)(2) (same).
83. FED. R. Cam. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1974) (quoting McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)) (emphasis added). As discussed in the Introduction supra, this
justification-that personally interrogating the defendant will develop a more complete record of the
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Committee further underscored the importance of the plea colloquy by noting that "[t]he fairness and adequacy of the procedures on acceptance of
pleas of guilty are of vital importance in according equal justice to all in the
federal courts."' Finally, the degree of detail and specificity with which
Rule 11 lists the conditions that must be satisfied for the court to accept a
plea might be seen as a further indication of the importance of the plea colloquy.85
The Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of having the
defendant present at the plea colloquy. In Boykin v. Alabama the Court considered a case in which the defendant pleaded guilty to five separate counts
of armed robbery and was later sentenced to death. At the colloquy, however, the judge did not ask the defendant any questions regarding his plea,
and the defendant did not address the court. 87 Noting the importance of a
plea colloquy, the Supreme Court ruled that "[a] plea of guilty is more than
a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a
conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment."88 Consequently, it held that a waiver of the constitutional rights
implicated by a guilty plea cannot be assumed from a silent record." Presence, in other words, was necessary for a proper plea colloquy, but not
sufficient to protect the defendant's rights.
B. The Importance of an Organization'sPresence
at the Plea Colloquy in Particular

Compelling the presence of the organizational defendant itself, rather
than having the organization's attorney appear on its behalf, is important for
two reasons. It addresses the concerns raised by the Advisory Committee
and the Supreme Court discussed above in Section H.A and it may further
the goals of corporate criminal liability.
Compelling attendance will adequately deal with the concerns of the
Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court. These two authorities have
identified several reasons why it is important for a defendant to appear personally at a plea colloquy, and each of those reasons applies to an
organizational defendant. First, the Advisory Committee notes that personally interrogating the defendant "will ... develop a more complete record to
plea colloquy-suggests that particular individuals should be compelled to appear. That is, to address this concern it would be better to have someone from the organization who knows a great deal
about the criminal conduct attend the hearing, rather than trying to find the highest-ranking executive or manager.
84.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1966).

85. Rule II has no fewer than eighteen separate conditions that must be satisfied for the
court to accept a defendant's guilty or nolo contendre plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b)(l)-(3).
86.

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1969).

87.

Id. at 239.

88.

Id. at 242 (emphasis added).

89.

Id. at 243.
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support his determination in a subsequent post-conviction attack."" As discussed in the Introduction, requiring the organization to appear will reduce
the probability that the organization's counsel will be unable to give details
about the criminal conduct. Interrogating the individuals most closely associated with the relevant conduct will better ensure that the record is
complete.
Second, the Advisory Committee considered the defendant's presence an
important safeguard to protect the "fairness and adequacy of the procedures
[and provide for] equal justice to all in the federal courts." 9' The Supreme
Court echoed this concern in Boykin.9 ' In the case of organizations, that purpose is also served by having the organization appear, rather than its
attorney: while attorneys have an ethical obligation to act in the best interests of their clients, having the defendant appear would at least mitigate any
claim a defendant has that it did not receive fair or just treatment in the
courts, as it actually would witness and play a role in the hearings.
Third and finally, the Advisory Committee stated it has a strong preference that defendants appear at the plea colloquy, though it did not provide
any specific rationale.93 Since the Rules apply equally to individual and organizational defendants-courts have in fact indicated that an organization
may challenge the sufficiency of the plea colloquy on the same terms as an
individual defendant"-that preference must be read to apply to organizations as well.
The goals of corporate criminal liability may also be furthered by compelling an organization's attendance. To be sure, it is a complex question
whether requiring an organization's attendance will satisfy the goals of corporate criminal liability. To find the answer, one must first consider the three
applicable justifications for punishment-retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation-and establish which ones are relevant in the organizational
context, and how important each is relative to the others. Given the large
90. FED. R. CIuM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1974) (quoting McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969)).
91.

FED.

R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1966) (emphasis added).

92.

395 U.S. at 242-43.

93.

See supra Section II.A.

94. See United States v. Electrodyne Sys. Corp., 147 F.3d 250, 252-53 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the organizational defendant's plea colloquy was not faulty and applying the same legal
standard used for individual defendants); United States v. Cota, No. CR 08-00160 SI, 2009 WL
1765647, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2009) (treating the requirements of a plea colloquy as applying with equal force to organizations as to individuals); United States v. Manuli Rubber Indus.,
S.P.A., No. 08-60198-CR, 2008 WL 5533574 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2008) (treating a corporation's
plea colloquy in exactly the same manner as it would an individual's plea colloquy). Cota is particularly relevant in that the court considered whether the filing of a plea application, which laid out the
information needed for a plea colloquy down on paper, fulfilled the requirements in 11(b). The court
concluded that the application was insufficient, and that an actual colloquy, held in open court, was
necessary for the corporate defendant. 2009 WL 1765647, at *3-4.
95. As discussed in the Introduction, the fourth justification for punishment, incapacitation,
doesn't apply in this context. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
four theories of punishment and how they relate to the thesis of this Note.
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scope of such a project, however, it will have to be put to the side. At the
same time, it is worthwhile to consider the ways that compelling organizational attendance at a plea colloquy may further or limit the realization of
the purposes of corporate criminal law.
Compelling attendance may further the goals of the criminal law in four
ways. First, a retributive effect may be brought about insofar as compelling
the organizational defendant to appear imposes an additional burden on that
organization and requires that the organization "personally" answer for its
criminal wrongdoing and be publicly condemned." Both of these consequences can be understood as a method of punishing the corporation,
viewed as a good in its own right under the retributivist framework. Second,
requiring attendance may serve to deter other organizations from committing criminal acts, as those who work for other organizations may wish to
avoid being haled into court and forced to go through a similar public proceeding. Third, compelling the organization to appear may serve to
rehabilitate the offending organization in two ways. As in the case of deterrence, the additional burdens imposed by requiring attendance could serve
equally well to directly disincentivize individuals within that organization
from committing another criminal act. Rehabilitation may also be brought
about indirectly by forcing a manager of the organization to appear: doing
so may "pierce" through to the decision makers of the organization in a way
that merely having counsel appear will not.
This last point deserves greater discussion. Much has been written on
the problems that attorneys for organizations face. In-house counsel, for
example, frequently confront difficult ethical dilemmas in which they are
given the choice of either failing to fulfill their obligations to ensure compliance and root out misconduct, or resigning or being terminated and
becoming a "pariah in the industry."7 This dilemma tends to incentivize inhouse counsel to avoid giving the full, negative legal picture to the officers
or board of directors." Moreover, corporate officers and directors are incentivized to distribute the legal work of the organization to different attorneys,
both in-house and outside, in order to "shop around" for lawyers who will
approve their proposals.9 While these kinds of issues are much discussed in
the literature,' the general point is that a disconnect frequently arises be96. E.g., Garcia-Aguilar v. U.S. Dist. Court, 535 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) ("A defendant's guilty plea is a confession, freely and publicly made, that he is a criminal. This has immediate
and enduring effects on the defendant's standing in the community, and for that reason and many
others is often an excruciating experience.").
97. Lisa H. Nicholson, Sarbox 307's Impact on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Between a
Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MicH. S. L. REV. 559, 598.
98. Id. at 598-99 ("[lIt may not be easy for any in-house counsel to bring situations where
the company's senior management is failing to take appropriate actions to the attention of the company's board of directors .....
99.

Id. at 599-600.

100. See, e.g., id.; E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses,
and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 Bus. LAW. 1 (2006); Sally
R. Weaver, Client Confidences in Disputes Between In-House Attorneys and Their EmployerClients: Much Ado About Nothing-Or Something?, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 483 (1997); Jan C.
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tween what an organization's attorneys know and what its managers know,
making it more likely that the organization will engage in wrongful behavior. Forcing a manager to appear personally at a plea colloquy may be a
means for the court to pierce through to the organization's decision makers,
thereby decreasing the likelihood that the organization will engage in cnminal conduct in the future.
Fourth and finally, compelling attendance may help to bring about a
more efficient system of justice: a court would be less likely to have to adjourn and reschedule a plea colloquy due to ill-informed counsel, as
illustrated by the hypothetical in the Introduction, if the organization is obligated to attend the proceeding.
The other side of the coin, however, is that compelling attendance comes
with disadvantages. First, requiring someone from the organization to appear can impose a significant burden on the individual actually appearing:
she will have to prepare for the hearing, travel to court, and suffer the negative publicity brought about by the plea colloquy. This may seem
particularly unfair as it is the organization, and not the individual appearing
on the organization's behalf, that is being held criminally liable. Second,
giving federal judges the discretion to compel attendance necessarily creates
the possibility that the discretion will be abused. As with any other power
given to the courts, judges may use their authority to compel attendance in a
way that is abusive or unjust to the organization or the individual being required to attend.'o'
Empirical data must be gathered to determine the extent to which compelling an organizational defendant to appear brings about these benefits and
disadvantages. However the facts turn out, Congress has already decided
that, at least in some contexts, high-ranking corporate officers must personally involve themselves in legal matters. Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 requires the CEO and CFO of a corporation to "certify in each
annual or quarterly report" that the officer has reviewed the report, that the
report is accurate to the best of the officer's knowledge, that internal controls are in place to ensure such material information is made known to the
officers, and that the officer has disclosed the information to the corporation's auditors."'0 The act, passed in the wake of several corporate scandals,
was intended to hold corporations accountable for their misconduct on the
theory that requiring senior management to become personally involved in
SEC filings would make criminal acts less likely. Importantly, the act didn't
expand or diminish any officer's legal responsibilities, but only required that
the CEO and CFO "certify" what they were already required to do.

Nishizawa, Note, Ethical Conflicts Facing In-House Counsel: Dealing with Recent Trends and an
Opportunityfor Positive Change,20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 849 (2007).
101. Whether and how much these disadvantages occur is, of course, an empirical question
beyond the scope of this Note.
102.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2006).
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C. The Rights Implicated in a Guilty Plea

A plea colloquy implicates a great number of the defendant's rights.
While it isn't necessary to go into great detail to support such an uncontroversial claim, it is worth recalling some of the rights waived at a plea
colloquy. Subdivisions (c)(3) and (c)(4) of Rule 11 were designed to satisfy
the requirements of understanding for a valid waiver set forth in Boykin v.
Alabama.'as Boykin explicitly noted three constitutional rights implicated by
a guilty plea: the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination,"
the Seventh Amendment's right to trial by jury,tos and the Sixth Amendment's right to confront one's accusers.'0 6 But there are a number of other
rights not mentioned in Boykin that are implicated by a plea colloquy. By
pleading guilty, an organizational defendant waives its right against double
jeopardy, 07 its right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, 08 its right
against unreasonable searches and seizures,'" and its right to due process
under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.n"0
Even more rights are implicated when an individual pleads guilty. For
example, whereas organizations do not have a right against selfincrimination,"' individual defendants do,"2 and they waive this right at a
plea colloquy. Further, while it is an open question whether a corporation
has a right to confront its accusers"' or a right against cruel and unusual
punishment, 14 the Constitution does vest these rights in individual defendants."' The fact that tliere are a great many fundamental rights implicated
103.

395 U.S. 238 (1969); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1974).

104. 395 U.S. at 243. However, the right against self-incrimination doesn't apply to corporations. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1988).
105. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. Corporations do have the right to a trial by jury. See Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1970).
106. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. It is unclear whether corporations have any rights under the
Confrontation Clause. See United States v. King, 134 F.3d 1173, 1175-77 (2d Cir. 1998).
107. Smith v. United States, 359 F.2d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568-76 (1977) (holding a corporation has a right against double jeopardy). See generally Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy'sAsymmetric Appeal Rights: What
Purpose Do They Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REv. 341 (2002) (discussing the policy rationales underlying
appeal rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause).
108. See United States v. Mfrs' Ass'n of the Relocatable Bldg. Indus., 462 F.2d 49, 50-51 (9th
Cir. 1972).
109. A corporation has a right against unreasonable searches and seizures, see Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), but when found guilty, it
no longer has any remedy available by invoking that right, having already been convicted.
110. See Relocatable Bldg., 462 F.2d at 49-50; see also Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co.,
147 U.S. 165 (1893); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
111.

Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104-)5 (1988).

112.

U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

113.

See United States v. King, 134 F.3d 1173, 1175-77 (2d Cir. 1998).

114.
(1989).
115.

Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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when an individual pleads guilty is one more reason to think that Rule 11
places a great deal of importance on the defendant's presence. Because
11(b) applies to all defendants-both organizational and individual"-that
preference must apply with equal force to organizational defendants.
D. Flexibility in Plea Colloquy Procedure

Federal district courts have a fair degree of flexibility in plea colloquy
procedures. In Brady v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the
validity of a guilty plea and held that the waiver of a constitutional right in
this context must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.""
The Court further held in McCarthy v. United States that district courts are
obligated to strictly comply with the procedures provided in Rule II."' At
the same time, while Rule I1's procedure is mandatory, "literal compliance
with its substance, not mere talismanic utterance of its words, is imperative."" 9 Even if all the literal requirements of Rule 11 are satisfied, that does
not mean that the district court has complied with the requirements of the
plea colloquy: "[t]he objective of [this rule] . .. is to flush out and resolve
all . . . issues [of voluntariness of plea], but like any procedural mechanism,

its exercise is neither always perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to subsequent challenge . . . ."120 The district courts must ensure that the substantive
protections the Rule attempts to give the defendant are in fact upheld. In that
vein, the Supreme Court held that Rule 11 "is designed to assist the district
judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary ... [and] to produce a complete record
at the time the plea is entered ... ."
Federal courts of appeals have made a similar determination. In United
States v. Saft, the Second Circuit held that in enacting the Rule:
Congress meant to strip district judges of freedom to decide what they
must explain to a defendant ... not to tell them precisely how to perform
this important task in the great variety of cases that would come before

them.... [I]t cannot be supposed that Congress preferred this to a more

116. See, e.g., United States v. Manuli Rubber Indus., S.P.A., No. 08-60198-CR, 2008 WL
5533574 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2008) (adopting a corporate defendant's plea colloquy, finding that the
defendant understands the rights being waived by the plea and is pleading knowingly and voluntarily); see also supra note 94.
117.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).

118.

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463 (1969).

119.

United States v. Clark, 574 F.2d 1357, 1358 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (emphasis add-

120.

Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215 (1973).

121.

McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465 (emphasis added).
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meaningful explanation, provided that all the specified elements were cov-

ered.122

As a result, while district courts must abide by Rule 1I's procedures, they
may choose to go further.
Two circuits have specifically considered whether statements by an individual'" defendant's counsel are enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule
11. In United States v. Tucker, the Fourth Circuit held that such statements
"do not satisfy Rule 1I's requirement that the court personally address the
defendant."'" In United States v. Cammisano, the Eighth Circuit made the
same determination, finding that the "defendant's statements expressing
confidence in his attorney and adopting his attorney's remarks were [insufficient] to show compliance with [the rule governing entry of guilty pleas]."',
The fundamental importance of the plea colloquy has thus been affirmed
by the language and history of the Rules, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and the large number of constitutional rights implicated in the
proceeding. District courts have flexibility in plea colloquy procedure and
there is a significant possibility that compelling attendance will further the
goals of the criminal law. These conclusions together support the view that
district courts have the authority to compel the attendance of organizational
defendants at plea colloquies.
III.

THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURT TO COMPEL ATTENDANCE

While the inherent powers of the federal courts are notoriously difficult
to define precisely, the doctrine tends to give wide latitude to the courts regarding undue delay and attendance. Because the doctrine is not based on
any statute, rule, or regulation, this Part constitutes an entirely separate and
independent justification for the thesis of this Note.
A. The Inherent Powers Doctrine

The Supreme Court has held that district courts have certain "inherent"
or "implied" powers, those that a court must have "because they are necessary to the exercise of all others." 26 "These powers are 'governed not by rule
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own

122. 558 F.2d 1073, 1079 (2d Cir. 1977) (second emphasis added); see also United States v.
Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[The] district courts are required to act in substantial
compliance with it although, as in the case of other subdivisions of Rule 11, ritualistic compliance is
not required.").
123. These cases necessarily apply only to individual, rather than organizational, defendants,
as 43(b)(1) on its face permits the absence of organizational defendants at a plea colloquy. However,
these cases serve to demonstrate the importance the federal courts have placed on plea colloquies.
124.

United States v. Tucker, 425 F.2d 624, 629 (4th Cir. 1970).

125.

United States v. Cammisano, 599 F.2d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 1979).

126. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)).
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affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.' ,127
The inherent powers doctrine has been interpreted broadly by various federal courts, encapsulating a number of different powers not found in any
rule or statute.128 Inherent powers include the ability of a district court to
manage its docket and ensure that matters are dealt with expeditiously.129
Courts may hold parties in contempt and impose sanctions on those appearing before the court."' The Supreme Court has gone so far as to say that
the adoption of the Federal Rules did not limit the scope of the court's in132
herent powers.
At the same time, the limits of the power are nebulous. Some commentators have suggested, for instance, that the doctrine should be extended to
give district courts the power to compel parties to participate in alternative
dispute resolution, arguing that this fits broadly into the established framework of the doctrine.13 The issue, however, remains open. Other
commentators have suggested that the doctrine corroborates the view that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16'3 gives the courts the power to compel
participation in settlement conferences; that issue, too, remains undecided.15
Given the established ambiguity of the courts' inherent powers, it is no surprise that commentators have called the doctrine "shadowy" and difficult to
define.1 6
B. Undue Delay and Attendance

While the precise outline of courts' inherent powers has never been
clearly drawn, there are two aspects of the doctrine which support the notion
127. Id. (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)); see also CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987); Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 146 (1985).
128.

See, e.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43-46; Link, 370 U.S. at 629.

129. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of FederalCourts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IowA L. REv. 735, 760 (2001).
130.

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43-44.

131.

Id. at 43-45.

132. See id. at 42-43 (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not diminish the
inherent powers of the courts and that the doctrine applies to all cases heard by the federal courts).
133. E.g., Amy M. Pugh & Richard A. Bales, The Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts to
Compel Participationin Nonbinding Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 42 DuQ. L. REV. I
(2003).
134. This rule permits a court to order the parties to appear at a pretrial conference to accomplish any one of a number of broad goals. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
135. E.g., Jennifer O'Hearne, Comment, Compelled Participationin Innovative PretrialProceedings, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 290 (1989); Tony J. Masciopinto, Note, G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Joseph Oat Corp.: Expanding Rule 16's Scope To Compel Represented Partieswith Full Settlement
Authority To Attend Pretrial Conferences, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 931 (1990). See generally G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989); Strandell v. Jackson County,
838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
136. E.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate PretrialDiscovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
480, 485 (1958). For background information on the inherent powers, see generally Pushaw, supra
note 129, at 760-82.
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that a district court can compel the attendance of an organizational defendant at a plea colloquy: undue delay and the compelling of attendance of
parties.
The Supreme Court has applied the inherent powers doctrine to cases
involving undue delay to the court's proceedings. In Link v. Wabash, the
Supreme Court considered a civil case that had been ongoing for six years.
The trial judge had notified all parties that there would be a pretrial conference on a particular date at 1:00 p.m. At 10:30 a.m. on the date of the
conference, the petitioner called the court and asked the judge's secretary to
inform the judge that he would not be able to attend because he was taking
care of some paperwork. The judge, finding that the petitioner had not articulated a reasonable basis for failing to appear, dismissed the action,
explicitly finding its ability to do so under the inherent powers doctrine.
Noting that "[t]he authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff's
action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be
doubted," the Court held that district courts have the inherent power to invoke such a sanction to prevent "undue delays in the disposition of pending
cases and to avoid congestion."""
A district court judge might find that compelling the presence of an organizational defendant at the plea colloquy is necessary to prevent undue
delay. For example, a court might believe that the defendant's counsel does
not have sufficient information to respond to the long series of questions
that are usually propounded at a plea colloquy," and rather than have several separate hearings, would prefer to have all parties present to avoid any
delay in the final disposition of the case. And if a district court may dismiss
a case with prejudice to avoid undue delay, it is plausible to assume it may
compel the attendance of the criminal defendant for the same reason.
The inherent powers doctrine has also given courts latitude in matters of
attendance. There are two circumstances in which a district court has the
authority to compel attendance or permit absence of an individual under the
inherent powers doctrine.'" First, a district court may compel the attendance
of the parties to a hearing to discuss the disappearance of evidence. In
Brockton Savings Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., the First Circuit

considered a case where the lower court entered a default judgment against
the defendant in a civil case involving a securities transaction.14' After failing to produce several documents for discovery, the defendant later claimed
that it did not have the documents in its possession. The magistrate ordered
the appearance of the defendant's president and a secretary to explain the
137.

Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 627 (1962).

138.

Id. at 629.

139. See FED. R. Cium. P. 1l(b)(1). A court is in fact forbidden from accepting a guilty plea
without first determining that the plea has a factual basis. E.g., FED. R. Chum. P. I1 (b)(3); Libretti v.
United States, 516 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1995).
140. This does not include compelling the parties' attendance for alternative dispute resolution. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
141.

771 F.2d 5, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1985).
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issue, but they did not attend.142 The court then adopted the magistrate's recommendation to enter a default judgment for the plaintiff and impose
sanctions on the defendant.143 The First Circuit upheld the trial court's decision, finding that the magistrate did have the authority to compel the
defendant's attendance and that the "failure to appear [is] one of several
grounds supporting the entry of a default judgment."'" Similarly, if a trial
court finds that the absence of an organizational defendant impedes the progress of the proceedings-for example, as discussed above, in cases where
the organizational defendant's absence makes fulfilling the requirements of
10(b) take significantly longer-the same reasoning in Brockton would apply and the appellate courts might very well uphold the decision to compel
attendance on inherent powers grounds.
Second, district courts have the authority to order a criminal defendant
to leave the courtroom during her own trial. In Illinois v. Allen, the Supreme
Court decided a case where a state court judge ordered the defendant to
leave the courtroom because his behavior was so disruptive that the trial
could not proceed.145 Though the Court noted that the right to be present at
trial was "[o]ne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause,"'4 it still held that the defendant can waive her right to be
present if she continues to be disruptive even after the judge has warned
her.147 And if a judge is permitted to order a defendant's absence, thereby
limiting the scope of her constitutional rights, then surely a judge may make
a similar order and compel the defendant's presence, thereby ensuring that
the defendant's rights are protected.
There are two points to make regarding how the Allen decision relates to
compelling the attendance of an organizational defendant. First, while Allen
dealt with the authority of a state court judge, the Supreme Court's ruling
applies with equal force to federal district courts. Allen deals with a federal
constitutional issue;148 moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 43
explicitly state the Rule was amended to incorporate Allen.149
Second, while the authority to remove a criminal defendant may appear
to be based on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court
based its decision on the inherent powers doctrine. The holding in Allen has
been incorporated into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5o and this
may suggest that the decision was based on the text of the Rules. However,
the basis of the Allen decision is explicitly grounded in the
142.

Id. at 9.

143.

Id.

144.

Id. at 12.

145.

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 339 (1970).

146.

Id. at 338.

147.

Id. at 342-43.

148.

Id. at 342; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

149.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 advisory committee's note (1974).

150.

FED. R. CluM. P. 43(c)(1)(C).
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inherent powers doctrine. The Allen Court appeared to reference the concept
when it stated, "Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently
with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts andjudicial
proceedings.""' In Chambers, the Court held in dicta that Allen was based

on the inherent powers doctrine, citing Allen for the proposition that "[t]here
are other facets to a federal court's inherent power. The court may bar from
the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a trial."' 2 As a result, the
Court's decision in Allen, which permits a federal district court judge to remove an obstreperous defendant from her own trial, is another example
where the inherent powers doctrine gives the district courts latitude in determining matters of attendance.
There is a counterpoint to consider. The inherent powers doctrine is primarily concerned with the ability of trial judges to efficiently manage their
courts.' That concern does not seem relevant when a court is trying to protect the rights of a party appearing before it: the concern about the fair
administration of justice or the importance of the rights that are waived at a
guilty plea does not bear on the issue of efficiency.'5 However, the narrow
point being made here is that if the inherent powers doctrine permits a court
to limit a defendant's constitutional rights to further some recognized goal
of the doctrine, then giving a court the power to enforce a similar order that
protects a constitutional right does not seem far-fetched, especially if some
goal of the inherent powers doctrine is also furthered. Section III.B notes
that compelling the presence of an organizational defendant may very well
serve the goal of efficient court management, which furthers a recognized
goal of the doctrine. At the same time, it would be odd to say that a court
has the ability to compel an organizational defendant under the inherent
powers doctrine only in cases where doing so would promote efficiency, but
not in cases where doing so would better protect a criminal defendant's
rights. It seems much more plausible to find that (1) because this power furthers a recognized goal of the inherent powers doctrine, it may be used at
any time by the court for any legitimate purpose, or (2) protecting a defendant's rights is in fact a goal of the inherent powers doctrine. In either case,
the doctrine would give the district courts the power to compel an organizational defendant's presence.

151.

397 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added).

152.

Chambers v.NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,44(1991).

153. See, e.g., id. at 43 ("It has long been understood that '[clertain implied powers must
necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot
be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.' " (quoting
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)) (emphasis added)).
154.

Thanks to Professor Radin for this critique.
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CONCLUSION

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state that organizational defendants need not be present at plea colloquies, but the Rules do not
explicitly state whether district courts can compel the attendance of unwilling defendants. Three main lines of reasoning indicate that district courts do
have this authority. First, a detailed analysis of a number of other Rules suggests that judges have the ability to compel attendance. Second, plea
colloquies implicate the most basic rights that our Constitution and justice
system vest in criminal defendants, and district courts traditionally have
been given a great deal of leeway in conducting those colloquies; moreover,
requiring an organization's attendance may substantially further the goals of
criminal law. Finally, the inherent powers doctrine gives district courts authority not found in any particular statute, rule, or regulation. The doctrine
has provided courts with flexibility in matters of undue delay and attendance
in particular.
While a detailed argument concerning a relatively minor subsection of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure might at first appear to be an obscure topic,
a deeper look reveals that the issue goes to the heart of why we have a criminal law in the first place. This analysis has clarified a number of other
provisions in the Rules, providing further guidance on the way our courts
should proceed in criminal cases. It has shown how compelling an organizational defendant's presence can serve to further the goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution. And finally, it is an independent good that
federal judges know what powers they have in their official capacity.
In sum, this Note has sought to provide some insight into the ways our
federal courts can ensure criminal defendants appearing before them are
dealt with in a manner that is not only efficient, but also just.
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